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Whatever happened to the New Economy? The good news is U.S. productivity
continues to grow at a healthy pace. This article sheds light on why information and
communications technology may continue to pay dividends for years to come.
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In the long run, a rising standard of liv-
ing depends primarily on rising produc-
tivity. For this reason, economists have
regarded the increase in U.S. productiv-
ity growth since the mid-1990s as an ex-
cellent development. But still unresolved
is the role of information technology
(computers, software, communications,
and the like) in the
productivity accelera-
tion. In particular, is




those that use it that
are having the great-
est impact on pro-
ductivity growth?
Much of the research
on the post-1995 pro-
ductivity acceleration
suggests that while the
ICT sectors of the
economy played an
important role in the
acceleration in total
factor productivity (TFP)—a broad
measure of productivity (explained
further below)—most of the TFP ac-
celeration took place outside of the pro-
duction of ICT goods and software.
In this Chicago Fed Letter, we report on
recent work that suggests that ICT can
itself explain some of the measured ac-
celeration in TFP in sectors using it. Im-
portantly, benefiting from ICT requires
substantial complementary invest-
ments in learning, reorganization,
and the like, so that the payoff in terms
of measured output may be long de-
layed. The development of electric pow-
er as a general purpose technology
provides a useful analogy. As a result,
it appears likely that relatively strong
productivity growth can remain for an
extended period.
Explaining productivity
Economists identify three direct factors
that boost labor productivity, defined
as output per hour. First, labor produc-
tivity generally rises over time because
workers have more and better capital
to work with—e.g., auto workers today
work with much larger and more sophis-
ticated assembly lines than those in
Henry Ford’s Model T assembly plants;
workers have more “computer” capital
to work with, because their computers
are better and faster as well as more
plentiful. Second, productivity rises over
time because of work force gains in ed-
ucation and skills,1 allowing workers
to produce more in each hour worked.
Finally, labor productivity rises because
of what economists call total factor pro-
ductivity. TFP is a catchall term for every-
thing not otherwise explained, but the
main reason TFP rises over time is inno-
vation—new products and new processes.
With this framework in mind, we can
identify two channels for ICT to affect
aggregate labor and TFP growth.2 First,
TFP non-
Period  accelerated ICT ICT
( - - - - percentage points - - - - )
Council of Economic
  Advisersa (’95–’02) – (’73–’95) 1.21 0.13 1.08
Basu, Fernald, Oulton,
  and Srinivasanb (2003)(’95–’00) – (’90–’95) 1.17 0.29 0.88
Jorgenson, Stiroh,
  and Ho (2002) (’95–’00) – (’90–’95) 0.40 0.12 0.27
Oliner and Sichel
  (2002) (’96–’01) – (’91–’95) 0.41 0.36 0.06
aStructural TFP figures, where output is based on average of income- and
product-side measures.
bFigures do not include an adjustment for changes in labor quality.
Notes: ICT and non-ICT contributions may not add up to TFP acceleration
due to rounding. See endnotes for citations.
Contribution
of
1. ICT contribution to the TFP accelerationinnovation in the sectors producing ICT
goods contributes directly to economy-
wide TFP growth. Second, the use of
ICT capital goods contributes directly
to labor productivity through capital
deepening: By reducing the effective
cost to a user of deploying capital, fall-
ing ICT prices induce firms to increase
their desired capital stock.
The 2003 Economic Report of the President
(Council of Economic Advisers) provides
a fairly recent estimate of the contribu-
tion of ICT to the acceleration in labor
productivity. The report states that after
controlling for business cycle effects, labor
productivity accelerated 1.73% per year in
the 1995–2002 period from the 1973–95
period. Of this acceleration, ICT contrib-
uted 0.53 percentage points per year: ICT
capital deepening, i.e., that each worker
had more ICT capital to work with, con-
tributed 0.40 percentage points per year;
and computer sector TFP contributed
0.13 percentage points (column 3 of
figure 1). Non-ICT capital-deepening
contributed 0.11 percentage points
per year; labor quality made a slight,
negative contribution (i.e., it improved
at about the same rate in the 1973–95
period as in the 1995–2002 period).
By contrast, structural TFP excluding ICT-
sector TFP contributed 1.08 percentage
points more per year from 1995 to 2002
than from 1973 to 1995. Figure 1 shows
a range of other recent studies that
provide a similar TFP decomposition.
All of these studies show some substantial
contribution to the overall TFP accel-
eration coming from sectors that use
rather than produce ICT. (The smallest
figure for the non-ICT TFP acceleration
is from Oliner and Sichel, 2002, who
discount their small non-ICT contribu-
tion on technical grounds.) The causes
of the TFP acceleration in ICT produc-
tion are reasonably well understood.
New product development, resulting
especially from R&D, has led to rapid
improvements in computer technolo-
gy. For example, as Jorgenson (2001)
and McKinsey (2001) discuss,3 compe-
tition between two major chip manu-
facturers, Intel and AMD, led to more
rapid introduction of new semiconduc-
tor chips in the post-1995 period, and
this faster pace of technological rollout
appears to explain a large share of the
ICT technology acceleration.
By contrast, there is little information
about the source of the TFP acceleration
outside of ICT production. In particu-
lar, there is no presumption that the
use of ICT should have any particular
effect on measured TFP. However, re-
cent work (much of it microeconomic,
firm-level, and anecdotal) suggests that
there are important—but often indirect
and hard to foresee—potential ways
for ICT to affect measured production
and productivity in sectors using ICT.
For example, Hubbard (2002) discusses
how on-board computers have substan-
tially raised TFP in trucking, in large
part by raising capacity utilization.4 Dis-
patchers have real-time access to infor-
mation on truck location and truck
loads; customers, truckers, and interme-
diaries reduce costly transactions and
search time; and firms have an easier time
monitoring drivers (thereby making
contracts easier to specify and enforce).
ICT as a general purpose technology
In theoretical terms, much of this dis-
cussion revolves around the notion of
“general purpose technologies” (GPTs).
This term is usually applied to innova-
tions, such as electricity or information
technology, that have a pervasive and
wide-ranging effect on how firms do
business or even how people live.5
What kinds of links might there be
between ICT use and measured TFP?
Conceptually, one can separate these
potential links into two categories: Pur-
poseful co-invention, the accumulation
of intangible “complementary capital”;
and externalities of one sort or another.
First, firm-level studies suggest that ben-
efiting from ICT investments requires
substantial and costly co-investments in
complementary capital.6 For example,
firms that use computers more inten-
sively may reorganize production, there-
by creating “intangible capital” in the
form of organizational knowledge. These
investments may include resources di-
verted to learning; they may involve pur-
poseful innovation arising from R&D.
The resulting “organizational capital”
is analogous to physical capital in that
companies accumulate it in a purposeful
way. We can think of this complementary
capital as an additional input into pro-
duction; it differs from ordinary capital
and labor in that it is not directly ob-
served.7 In other words, this channel is,
in essence, the standard capital-deep-
ening story, except that the input of in-
tangible capital may not be measured.8
Second, the GPT literature suggests the
likelihood of sizeable externalities to ICT.
For example, successful new managerial
ideas—including those that take advan-
tage of ICT, such as the use of a new busi-
ness information system—seem likely to
diffuse to other firms, which learn by
watching and analyzing the experimenta-
tion, the successes, and, importantly, the
mistakes made by others. Indeed, firms
that don’t use computers more intensively
may also benefit from spillovers of intan-
gible capital. For example, if there are
sizable spillovers to R&D, and if R&D is
more productive with better computers,
then even firms that don’t use comput-
ers intensively may benefit from the
knowledge created by computers.
The nature of the co-inventions and ex-
ternalities suggests that we should not
expect the benefits of ICT to diffuse in-
stantaneously. First, if large complemen-
tary investments and innovations are
necessary, diffusion of ideas from one
firm to another will inevitably take time.
Second, Bresnahan and Trajtenberg
(1995) note that co-invention often re-
quires “coordination between agents lo-
cated far from each other along the time
and technology dimension” (p. 3), so that
institutional arrangements and market
structure are likely to matter; these factors
are likely to differ across countries. Third,
adoption costs and adoption benefits may
differ across firms, so that low adoption
cost/high adoption benefit firms may
adopt new technologies first.9 Finally,
spillover effects may be stronger at closer
distances (e.g., within Silicon Valley).
Electricity as a general purpose
technology
A number of people have argued that the
diffusion of electricity provides an appro-
priate analogy for the likely delayed ben-
efits of ICT.10 Certainly, electricity provides
numerous specific examples of how a
GPT transforms business and householdMichael H. Moskow, President; Charles L. Evans,
Senior Vice President and Director of Research;  Douglas
Evanoff, Vice President, financial studies; David
Marshall, team leader, macroeconomic policy research;
Daniel Sullivan, Vice President, microeconomic policy
research;  William Testa, Vice President, regional
programs and Economics Editor; Helen O’D. Koshy,
Editor; Kathryn Moran, Associate Editor.
Chicago Fed Letter is published monthly by the
Research Department of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago. The views expressed are the
authors’ and are not necessarily those of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago or the Federal
Reserve System. Articles may be reprinted if the
source is credited and the Research Department
is provided with copies of the reprints.
Chicago Fed Letter is available without charge from
the Public Information Center, Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago, P.O. Box 834, Chicago, Illinois
60690-0834, tel. 312-322-5111 or fax 312-322-5515.
Chicago Fed Letter and other Bank publications
are available on the World Wide Web at http://
www.chicagofed.org.
ISSN 0895-0164
life. Benefiting from electricity, however,
required dramatic reorganizations of
production as well as a spate of new
products. As a result, the benefits took
many decades to unfold.
In particular, substantial co-invention
was necessary to reap the major benefits
of electrification. The major innovations
in electricity per se were the invention
of the electric dynamo, which changes
mechanical power into electric power,
and the subsequent invention of the
electric motor. At first, factories simply
replaced existing large steam-driven en-
gines with large electrical motors as the
power source driving the central shafts
and turbines. Not surprisingly, the ben-
efits were small and incremental. But
engineers began to realize that electric
motors were much more flexible than
steam power, allowing them to redesign
factories in much more efficient ways,
with small electrified machines through-
out the factory; workflow rather than
proximity to the central power shaft be-
came the organizational principle.11 Cou-
pled with innovative ideas such as Henry
Ford’s assembly line, electric power run
through wiring proved to be an advance-
ment from the original power shafts,
which would have been ill-suited for the
assembly line.12 Ford’s new system then
led to additional benefits through the
introduction of interchangeable parts
and mass production, which both rev-
olutionized production.
Once houses were electrified, new prod-
ucts were invented that directly benefited
households. Gordon (2000) observes
the myriad ways in which, after a substan-
tial lag, new electrified consumer appli-
ances greatly improved the quality of
life—e.g., by eliminating manual laun-
dry with electric washing machines and
food spoilage with refrigerators.13
Greenwood, Shesadri, and Yorukoglu
(2002) argue that household appliances
helped women move into the labor force
by making household chores easier and
faster and creating more free time (see
also Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2003).14
Evidence for ICT as a GPT
As noted earlier, the empirical literature
suggests that measured TFP reflects an
acceleration in sectors that use (rather
than simply produce) ICT products. TFP
can, of course, move around for a lot
of reasons unrelated to ICT. For exam-
ple, it could be that the U.S. experienced
broad-based managerial innovations that
raised TFP growth throughout the econ-
omy. Nevertheless, the GPT consider-
ations suggest that the acceleration in
measured TFP—and the managerial in-
novations that cause it—could be asso-
ciated with the use of ICT.
For example, Brynjolfsson and Hitt
(2003)15 find that in a sample of 527 large
U.S. firms from 1987 to 1994, the full
benefits of computers for output and
productivity do not appear to be real-
ized for at least five to seven years. They
interpret their results as suggesting the
importance of combining computer in-
vestments with “large and time-consum-
ing investments in complementary
inputs, such as organizational capital.”
At a more aggregated industry level, sev-
eral studies explore whether TFP growth
across industries is correlated with ICT
intensity. In contrast to firm-level stud-
ies, these industry studies rarely find
much contemporaneous correlation be-
tween ICT capital and TFP growth (e.g.,
Stiroh, 2002, and Wolff, 2002).16 But giv-
en the GPT nature of ICT, the contem-
poraneous correlation need not be
positive—even if ICT is, in fact, an im-
portant contributor to measured TFP.
For example, implementing new ICT
intensive production methods likely re-
quires a diversion of resources toward
learning and organizational change,
which temporarily disrupts production.
Wolff does find that U.S. industries
investing heavily in ICT have greater
changes in their occupational mix and
the composition of intermediate inputs,
consistent with substantial reorganiza-
tion. Gust and Marquez (2003) find that
industrial countries with a more burden-
some regulatory environment (especially
affecting labor market practices) adopt-
ed ICT more slowly and also had slower
TFP growth.17 Those findings are con-
sistent with the notion that the uptake
of ICT could affect measured TFP in
the sectors using the ICT.
Basu, Fernald, Oulton, and Srinivasan
(2003) find that the industry data are
reasonably consistent with the predic-
tions that in sectors using ICT, ICT cap-
ital growth should, with long lags, be
positively associated with TFP growth.
In particular, they find evidence that ICT
capital investments in the 1980s and ear-
ly 1990s are positively correlated with
the TFP acceleration in the late 1990s.
Conclusion
At the peak of the “New Economy” hype
of the late 1990s, many argued that “The
Internet changes everything.” The pre-
sumption was that the changes would
take place almost overnight. But the
lessons from previous general purpose
technologies such as electricity, as well
as recent theoretical and empirical work,
suggest that the necessary complemen-
tary investments and innovations take
place only with long lags. Thus, it could
be that the promise of the Internet and
other new technologies will continue
to be realized—but over a long period.
More generally, though, the sustained,
strong productivity performance of the
U.S. economy gives grounds for cautious
optimism that when the overhang of
recent bad shocks ends, the economy
could return to relatively robust rates
of growth. To the extent that ICT is,
indeed, a general purpose technology,
the returns to innovation (whether
managerial innovations or the devel-
opment of new products and process-
es) are likely to remain high for some
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